
During their work on the google/security-research repository, Akrasuski developed proof-of-concept exploits targeting advanced CPU vulnerabilities, including page table side-channel attacks and Branch History Injection. They implemented these attacks using C and assembly, providing reproducible artifacts and detailed documentation to facilitate validation and threat modeling. Their approach combined low-level systems programming with performance analysis and vulnerability research, enabling cross-architecture testing and clear guidance for defensive measures. By focusing on both the technical depth of exploit development and the clarity of supporting materials, Akrasuski delivered work that advanced understanding of hardware security risks and informed mitigation strategies for affected Intel architectures.
May 2025 monthly summary for google/security-research focused on vulnerability demonstration artifacts and defensive readiness rather than production fixes. Delivered a PoC for Branch History Injection (BHI) vulnerability in an intra-mode context, with reproducible assembly and C sources to illustrate the attack surface and guide mitigations across affected Intel architectures. The work provides actionable material for validation, defense testing, and patch prioritization.
May 2025 monthly summary for google/security-research focused on vulnerability demonstration artifacts and defensive readiness rather than production fixes. Delivered a PoC for Branch History Injection (BHI) vulnerability in an intra-mode context, with reproducible assembly and C sources to illustrate the attack surface and guide mitigations across affected Intel architectures. The work provides actionable material for validation, defense testing, and patch prioritization.
March 2025 monthly summary for google/security-research: Delivered a proof-of-concept demonstrating Evict+Time and Prime+Probe cache-timing attacks during page table walks, with a C implementation and build instructions. This work advances understanding of page-table side channels and informs threat modeling, mitigations, and responsible disclosure planning. No major bugs fixed this month; the focus was on delivering a reproducible PoC and accompanying documentation.
March 2025 monthly summary for google/security-research: Delivered a proof-of-concept demonstrating Evict+Time and Prime+Probe cache-timing attacks during page table walks, with a C implementation and build instructions. This work advances understanding of page-table side channels and informs threat modeling, mitigations, and responsible disclosure planning. No major bugs fixed this month; the focus was on delivering a reproducible PoC and accompanying documentation.

Overview of all repositories you've contributed to across your timeline