
Over a two-month period, contributed advanced security research to the google/security-research repository by developing proof-of-concept exploits targeting CPU microarchitectural vulnerabilities. Delivered a C and assembly implementation of Evict+Time and Prime+Probe cache-timing attacks during page table walks, providing reproducible artifacts and detailed documentation to support vulnerability validation and threat modeling. Additionally, created a Branch History Injection (BHI) exploit in both C and assembly, demonstrating intra-mode attack surfaces on Intel architectures and informing mitigation strategies. The work emphasized low-level systems programming, performance analysis, and vulnerability research, offering actionable resources for security assessment, defense testing, and responsible disclosure planning.
May 2025 monthly summary for google/security-research focused on vulnerability demonstration artifacts and defensive readiness rather than production fixes. Delivered a PoC for Branch History Injection (BHI) vulnerability in an intra-mode context, with reproducible assembly and C sources to illustrate the attack surface and guide mitigations across affected Intel architectures. The work provides actionable material for validation, defense testing, and patch prioritization.
May 2025 monthly summary for google/security-research focused on vulnerability demonstration artifacts and defensive readiness rather than production fixes. Delivered a PoC for Branch History Injection (BHI) vulnerability in an intra-mode context, with reproducible assembly and C sources to illustrate the attack surface and guide mitigations across affected Intel architectures. The work provides actionable material for validation, defense testing, and patch prioritization.
March 2025 monthly summary for google/security-research: Delivered a proof-of-concept demonstrating Evict+Time and Prime+Probe cache-timing attacks during page table walks, with a C implementation and build instructions. This work advances understanding of page-table side channels and informs threat modeling, mitigations, and responsible disclosure planning. No major bugs fixed this month; the focus was on delivering a reproducible PoC and accompanying documentation.
March 2025 monthly summary for google/security-research: Delivered a proof-of-concept demonstrating Evict+Time and Prime+Probe cache-timing attacks during page table walks, with a C implementation and build instructions. This work advances understanding of page-table side channels and informs threat modeling, mitigations, and responsible disclosure planning. No major bugs fixed this month; the focus was on delivering a reproducible PoC and accompanying documentation.

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